Daniel K. Dygert and Stephanie C. Dygert v. Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Daniel K. Dygert and Stephanie C. Dygert v. Alan
M. Collier and Mike Youngberg : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert W. Hughes; Counsel for Appellees.
Marty E. Moore; Bearnson & Peck; Counsel for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dygert v. Collier, No. 20020878 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4018
Case No. 20020878 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANIEL K. DYGERT and STEPHANIE C. DYGERT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
ALAN M. COLLIER and MIKE YOUNGBERG, 
Defendants and Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Second District Court, Davis County 
The Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
ROBERT W. HUGHES(#1573) BEARNSON & PECK, 
LC 
111 East 300 South, Suite 370 Marty E. Moore (#8932) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 74 West 100 North 
(801) 364-9075 Logan, UT 84321 
(435) 787-9700 
Counsel for Appellees mmoore@cachelaw.com 
Counsel for i^ uielLajTis* 
Utah Cmmrt nf Ampioalc 
JUN 0 3 2003 
Pautette Stagg 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES BELOW 
Plaintiffs: Daniel K. Dygert 
Stephanie C. Dygert 
Defendants: Chicago Title Insurance Company 
Bonneville Title Company, Inc. 
Clearwater Oaks, L.C. 
Alan M. Collier 
Mike Youngberg 
CITATIONS TO RECORD 
Citations to the record on appeal will be designated in parenthesis as RA followed 
by the page number(s) assigned by the clerk of court below in the judgment roll and 
index, e.g., (RA 103) designates record on appeal page 103. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES BELOW i 
CITATIONS TO RECORD i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 1 
Issue No. 2 1 
Standard of Review 2 
Citation to Record 2 
CITATION OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
16-10a-622 Liability of shareholders 4 
48-2c-104 Separate legal entity 4 
48-2c-l 16 Member or manager as a party to proceedings 4 
48-2c-601 General rule 4 
57-3-102 Record imparts notice -Change in interest rate —Validity of document — 
Notice of unnamed interests —Conveyance by grantee 4 
68-3-1 Common law adopted 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 12 
ii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Argument 18 
Second Argument 18 
Third Argument 19 
ARGUMENT 20 
I. Appellees Are Personally Liable for Their Own Tortious Acts Committed 
on Behalf of Their LLC. 
Tort Law 20 
Agency Law 27 
Tort and Agency Law 27 
II. Appellees Individually Owed Multiple Duties to the Dvgerts. Including: 1) 
A Duty Not to Injure: 2) A Duty to Refrain from Acts that Were 
Reasonably Risky: 3) A Duty to Disclose a Material Defect: and 4) A Duty 
to Supply Correct Information. 
Duty Not To Injure 32 
Duty To Refrain From Risky Acts 32 
Duty to Disclose Known Material Defects 33 
Duty to Supply Correct Information 33 
III. The Dygerts Justifiably Relied Upon Appellees Misrepresentations About 
The True State Of Title To The Property They Were Purchasing. 34 
Constructive Notice Not Applicable 37 




Order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment (RA 758, 759). . . A-l 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (RA 752-755) A-3 
Map of Subdivision A-7 
18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1877 (1985) A-8 
Personal Liability of Corporate Officers, 
For the Defense, June 2002, pp. 44-59 A-13 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188 (UT 1993) 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 
666 P.2d 302 (UT 1983) 19, 33, 35, 37, 38 
Dugan v. Jones, 
615P.2d ) 19,35,37,38 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 
48 P.3d 235 (UT 2t 18 ;~0,33 
Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 
70 S.W. 3d 252 (Tex.App.- San Antonio, 2001) 
haitntans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al, 
63 P.2d231 (UT 1936) 18, 27, 29, 32 
Low v. CityofMonticello, 
54 P.3d 1153 (UT 2002) ^0 
Murphey Tugboat Co., Ltd. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd, 
467 F.Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
/.„.;.„/ 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1713 (1982) 28 
Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 
699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985) 15?. 27. 29, 32 
PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 
78 Cal.App.4th I WiS (Ciil.App.AI .!0<H>| 1 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 
952 P.2d 577 (UT Ap^ j 
Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc., 
21 P.3d 219 (UT App. 2000) 19, 38 
v 
Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 
10 P.3d 338 (UT 2000) 12 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (UT 1985) 39 
WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp., 
54P.3d 1139 (UT2002) 2 
STATUTES 
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877 18,22,27,28 
CJA 4-501 9 
Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P 7, 8,10 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 4,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (2) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101 etseq 21, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-104 4, 21,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-116 4, 21, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 4, 21, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 5,25 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
vi 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
"Asset Protection: Domestic and International Law And Tactics, Chapter 18 Limited 
Liability Companies," Duncan E. Osborne and Elizabeth Morgan Shurig, 2 Asset 
Protection: Dom. & Int'l L. & Tactics § 18:08, 2002 26 
"Limited Liability Companies: Issues In Member Liability," Karin Schwindt, 44 UCLA 
L.Rev. 1541, 1548 25 
"Personal Liability of Corporate Officers" [June 2002, "For The Defense"] 23 
"Tax-Advantaged Securities Handbook, Chapter 12A. The Limited Liability Company," 
Robert J. Haft and Peter M. Fass, 2 Tax Adv. Sec. Handbook § 12A:7,2002 .. 26 
"Those Delaware LLCS-Another Look How They Could Work For You," Frederic J. 
Bendremer,10 -JUN Bus.L.Today 43,45 25 
N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 18A:3, 2002 26 
vii 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
By order, this matter was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals. (RA 813). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provides in pertinent part: 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 
APPELLEES THEMSELVES COMMITTED TORTIOUS ACTS BY 
AFFIRMATIVELY MISREPRESENTING AND CONCEALING 
INFORMATION ABOUT A MATERIAL DEFECT IN RESIDENTIAL REAL 
PROPERTY FROM THE DYGERTS, WHO WERE PURCHASING THE 
PROPERTY. IN DOING SO, APPELLEES ACTED AS REPRESENTATIVES 
OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY IN WHICH THEY WERE THE 
ONLY TWO MEMBERS. DID APPELLEES OWE A LEGAL DUTY TO THE 
DYGERTS SUCH THAT APPELLEES ARE INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR 
THEIR OWN TORTIOUS CONDUCT? 
Issue No. 2 
A TITLE COMPANY CONSPIRED WITH APPELLEES TO "INSURE OVER" 
A BILLBOARD SIGN LEASE ENCUMBERING RESIDENTIAL REAL 
PROPERTY BEING SOLD TO THE DYGERTS, MEANING THE LEASE 
WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED IN TITLE REPORTS. IN RELIANCE UPON 
APPELLEES' AFFIRMATIVE MISSTATEMENTS AND TITLE REPORTS 
REGARDING THE PROPERTY, THE DYGERTS DID NOT PERSONALLY 
SEARCH TITLE RECORDS. WERE THE DYGERTS LEGALLY REQUIRED 
TO SEARCH TITLE RECORDS OR DID THEY JUSTIFIABLY RELY ON 
APPELLEES' AFFIRMATIVE MISSTATEMENTS AND TITLE REPORTS? 
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Standard of Review 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing 
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' ("the Dygerts") Amended Complaint against 
Defendants/Appellees Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg ("Appellees"). The 
appropriate standard of review for both issues is set forth in WebBank v. American 
General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1143 (UT 2002): 
A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see 
also Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,121, 48 P.3d 895; 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 15, 44 P.3d 781; State ex rel Div. of 
Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 8, 44 
P.3d 680. The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment 
is a question of law. Holmes Dev., 2002 UT 38 at f 21. In deciding 
whether summary judgment was appropriate, we need review only 
whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and 
whether a material fact was in dispute. Id.; Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 
16,112,28 P.3d 1271. "We thus review the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness, according them no deference." Holmes 
Dev., 2002 UT 38 at f 21; see also Ault, 2002 UT 33 at f 15. 
Citation to Record 
Both issues were addressed in the trial court in Appellees' pleadings entitled 
Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Supporting Memorandum (RA 197-340); Defendant Alan M. Collier and Mike 
Youngberg's Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 447-460); 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's Motion 
for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings (RA 566-580); Defendants 
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Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's Reply to Plaintiffs9 Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment (RA 658-668). In addition, both issues were addressed in the trial 
court in the Dygerts' pleadings entitled Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan 
M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 374-424); 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's 
Motion for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings (RA 583-647); and 
Notice of Filing of Supplemental Authorities Regarding Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg's Motion for Summary 
Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings, which included a law journal article on the 
issue of personal liability of corporate officers and directors (RA 648-655). 
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CITATION OF LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
The following statutory provisions in Utah Code Annotated are of importance in 
this appeal: 
16-10a-622 Liability of shareholders. 
(1) A purchaser from a corporation of shares issued by the corporation is 
not liable to the corporation or its creditors with respect to the shares except to pay 
or provide the consideration for which the issuance of the shares was authorized 
under Section 16-10a-621 or specified in the subscription agreement under 
Section 16-10a-620. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder 
or subscriber for shares of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or 
debts of the corporation solely by reason of the ownership of the corporation's 
shares. 
48-2c-104 Separate legal entity. A company formed under this chapter is 
a legal entity distinct from its members. 
48-2c-116 Member or manager as a party to proceedings. A member or 
manager of a company is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a 
company, except when the object is to enforce a member's or manager's right 
against, or liability to, the company. 
48-2c-601 General rule. Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no 
organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under 
a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of the company 
or of any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of the company. 
57-3-102 Record imparts notice —Change in interest rate —Validity of 
document —Notice of unnamed interests —Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement 
complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the 
time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all 
persons of their contents. 
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(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying 
secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with 
notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not 
named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears 
as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes 
the real property subject to the interest. 
68-3-1 Common law adopted. The common law of England so far as it 
was not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United 
States, or the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the 
necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Dygerts appeal from a final Order dated October 9, 2002 issued by the 
Second District Court, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson, granting Appellees' motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing the Dygerts' Amended Complaint against Appellees. 
(RA 758, 759). The appeal is taken from the entire Order as well as Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law issued by the Second District Court, the Honorable Glen R. 
Dawson, on the 9th day of October, 2002, and incorporated by reference into the final 
Order. (RA 752-755). 
The Dygerts commenced the action below by filing a Complaint in June 2001 
against the following defendants: Chicago Title Insurance Company, Bonneville Title 
Company, Inc., Clearwater Oaks, L.C., Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg. (RA 4-
20). The Complaint set forth six claims: 1) fraud and misrepresentation (against all 
defendants); 2) conspiracy to defraud (against all defendants); 3) negligent 
misrepresentation (against all defendants); 4) breach of contract (against Defendant 
Clearwater Oaks, L.C.); 5) breach of warranty (against Defendant Clearwater Oaks, 
L.C.); and 6) constructive trust (against Defendants Collier and Youngberg). (RA 4-20). 
After answers were filed by all the defendants and discovery begun, the trial court 
granted the Dygerts leave to amend their original Complaint. (RA 363-364). The 
Dygerts then filed their Amended Complaint (RA 344-362), and Appellees filed their 
Answer to Amended Complaint (RA 425-434). 
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Appellees first sought summary judgment under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., by filing a 
document entitled Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum (RA 197-340), on the grounds that 
they cannot be held personally liable for their individual acts committed on behalf of 
their limited liability company ("LLC"). Included in the many exhibits attached to 
Appellees' first summary judgment motion was a complete copy of Plaintiffs' Responses 
to Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C., Alan M. Collier, and Mike Youngberg's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiffs (RA 313-329), in which the Dygerts set forth, under oath, the basis for their 
claims against Appellees. 
The Dygerts responded to Appellee's first motion for summary judgment by filing 
their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan M. Collier's and Mike 
Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 374-424), in which the Dygerts set 
forth facts supported by an affidavit, deposition transcripts, discovery responses and 
other documents. These facts supported the allegations against Appellees set forth in the 
Dygerts' Amended Complaint (RA 344-362). Appellees then filed their Notice to Submit 
for Decision (RA, 435-436), and the trial court issued its Minute Entry Ruling (RA 439), 
stating that: 
[I]t is the opinion of this Court that there are genuine issues of 
material fact in existence in this matter which prevent the granting 
of summary judgment in any of the areas submitted by counsel. 
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied. 
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Appellees next filed a document entitled Motion for Reconsideration (RA 445-
446) and another entitled Defendants Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngbergs Reply to 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (RA 447-460). In their reply 
memorandum, Appellees did not dispute any of the Dygerts' statement of additional facts 
in a manner contemplated by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., that is, by affidavit, deposition 
transcript or other method. Id. Rather, Appellees reiterated their claims that it was 
Clearwater Oaks, L.C. ("Clearwater Oaks") - Appellees5 limited liability company- that 
committed the tortious acts alleged in the Amended Complaint. Id. Appellees thus 
asserted: 
The acts complained of by the Plaintiffs are clearly the acts of the 
owner of the property which was the LLC. Accordingly, as a matter 
of law, the individual Defendants are not and cannot be personally 
liable for the acts alleged in Plaintiffs (sic) Amended Complaint. 
(RA 449). 
In response, the Dygerts filed a document entitled Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion for Reconsideration (RA 461-463) in which 
the Dygerts did not object to the Court considering Appellees' reply memorandum. 
However, the Dygerts did note that Appellees' reply memorandum was "replete with 
factual disputes." (RA 462). The court below then heard oral argument on Appellees' 
Motion for Reconsideration and denied the motion. (RA 563). The Court's ruling was 
memorialized in the Order Denying Defendants Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (RA 669-670). 
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Appellees then made their third attempt at summary judgment, filing a document 
entitled Memorandum in Support of Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngbergs 
Motion for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings. (RA 566-580). For 
this third attempt at summary judgment, however, Appellees did not file a new motion 
seeking such relief as required by CJA 4-501. Nor did Appellees' memorandum include 
any exhibits. Id. Instead, Appellees re-argued their previous position that they could not 
be held personally liable for the acts of their limited liability company, Clearwater Oaks, 
L.C. (RA 567-569, 578-579), then raised new issues. Appellees' assertions were 
summarized in the conclusion to their memorandum, which stated: 
Even if the individual defendants had participated in some wrongful 
act or omission, which is denied, the Plaintiffs' causes of action 
based upon fraud and/or misrepresentation must be dismissed 
against them personally because, as a matter of law, neither of the 
individual defendants had a duty to the Plaintiffs. Further, the 
Plaintiffs cannot meet the requirement that their reliance on the 
statement or omission of the individual defendants was justifiable. 
Plaintiffs could [not] justifiably rely on the nondisclosure of a Lease, 
which Lease was a public record. Further, Plaintiffs also had 
"inquiry notice" of the Lease by reason of the indication on the plat 
map referencing the lease. Defendant Clearwater Oaks, the owner 
and seller of the property, may have had a duty, if one existed, but 
not the individual defendants personally. 
(RA 579). 
The Dygerts responded with their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Alan 
M. Collier's and Mike Youngberg 's Motion for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on 
the Pleadings. (RA 583-647). In this memorandum in opposition, the Dygerts again set 
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forth numerous facts supporting their claims in their Amended Complaint against 
Appellees and included supporting exhibits as required by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P. (RA 583-
647). This memorandum in opposition highlighted certain of Appellees' individual 
tortious actions, noted disputes over material facts and addressed the legal issues raised 
by Appellees in their memorandum. (RA 584-601). 
Shortly thereafter, the Dygerts also filed a document entitled Notice of Filing of 
Supplemental Authorities Regarding Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants Alan M. Collier *s and Mike Youngberg 's Motion for Summary Judgment or 
for Judgment on the Pleadings. (RA 648-655). Attached to the notice was an article 
entitled Personal Liability of Corporate Officers that had just been published in the June 
2002 edition of'The Defense" magazine. (RA 650-655). 
Appellees filed their reply memorandum entitled Defendants Alan M. Collier and 
Mike Youngberg's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment (RA 658-668). 
On August 20,2002, the trial court held a hearing on the third round of 
memoranda regarding Appellees' efforts to obtain summary judgment or dismissal. (RA 
690). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and 
scheduled a telephonic hearing on September 17, 2002 for the purpose of announcing its 
ruling. Id. On September 17,2002, the trial court rendered its decision (RA 751), as set 
forth in its Order (RA 758-759) and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (RA 752-
10 
755), both of which are dated October 9,2002 and were filed October 10, 2002. The 
Dygerts timely filed their Notice of Appeal on October 18,2002. (RA 760). 
All other defendants in this action have been dismissed by order of the trial court 
upon stipulation of the parties. (RA 365-366,437-438, 749-750, 756, 757). Therefore, 
the October 9,2002 Order of the trial court is a final order. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Appellees are developers who in 1997 organized Clearwater Oaks, L.C. 
("Clearwater Oaks") for the purpose of purchasing and developing real property. (RA 
197,198). Appellees were the only members of Clearwater Oaks. (RA 224, 230-233). 
In 1997 Clearwater Oaks bought lots in a subdivision adjoining the west side of the 1-15 
corridor in West Bountiful. (RA 347, 389). Shortly after the purchase, Appellees and 
Clearwater Oaks entered into a dispute with the billboard sign company that held 
leasehold rights to construct and maintain billboard signs on the lots Appellees had 
purchased. (RA 347, 395, 398-400,407, 408,410, 411,414-417). 
This dispute over the billboard sign lease lasted from 1998 until early 2000, when 
a lawsuit between Clearwater Oaks and the billboard sign company was settled. Id. 
Clearwater Oaks commenced its lawsuit against the billboard sign company before the 
Dygerts contracted to purchase their property, and the lawsuit continued until shortly 
after the Dygerts closed on the purchase of their property in December 1999. (RA 347, 
395,407,411,414-417). Appellees knew that the billboard sign lease encumbered 
1
 The facts set forth in the Statement of Facts are drawn from the pleadings, 
portions of depositions on file, responses to discovery requests on file, affidavits and 
other exhibits submitted with memoranda supporting and opposing Appellees' motions 
for summary judgment. See Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 
339 (UT 2000)("summary judgment is appropriate only 'if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'") 
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the residential real property purchased by the Dygerts, yet they never once told the 
Dygerts about the lease encumbrance on the property. (RA 395,408,414-417, 608-
610). Nor did the title company or real estate agent involved notify the Dygerts of the 
existence of the billboard sign lease. (RA 610). 
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that Appellees were aware in 
1999 that disclosure of the billboard sign lease encumbrance to the Dygerts, as 
prospective buyers, would likely have caused the Dygerts to back out of their purchase of 
a home and lot. (RA 348,349). Approximately a year before the Dygerts contracted to 
purchase Lot 2, the purchasers of adjoining Lot 1, Wayne and Amy Clausing ("the 
Clausings"), walked out of their real estate closing transaction with Clearwater Oaks 
when they learned that the billboard sign lease encumbered that lot. (RA 323, 324, 348, 
411, 628). The Clausings did not purchase Lot 1 until they were assured that the 
billboard sign lease had been removed from that property. Id. 
The Dygerts contracted to purchase their property - Lot 2 - from Clearwater Oaks 
on May 17, 1999 - after Clearwater Oaks had filed its lawsuit against the billboard sign 
company. (RA 199, 398, 402). Appellee Youngberg signed the contract documents as a 
representative of Clearwater Oaks. (RA 199, 301-310). 
Before contracting, Appellee Youngberg provided the Dygerts with a copy of a 
plat map purporting to show easements of record affecting Lot 2. (RA 377, 378, 389, 
603). The plat map showed that the billboard sign lease only encumbered a portion of 
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another lot in the subdivision - Lot 5 - which is where a billboard sign is conspicuously 
located. (RA 389). When Appellee Youngberg showed the misleading plat map to 
the Dygerts, Appellees knew that the plat map was incorrect and that the billboard 
sign lease, in fact, encumbered Lot 2, which the Dygerts ultimately purchased. (RA 
319,408,411,628). 
At the time of contracting on May 17,1999, Appellee Youngberg also provided 
the Dygerts with a form real estate document entitled "Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosure (Land)," in which he affirmatively misrepresented that: 1) there was no 
ongoing litigation affecting Lot 2; 2) there were no undisclosed easements affecting 
Lot 2; and 3) there was nothing that should be disclosed that materially or 
adversely affected the value of Lot 2. (RA 391, 392, 605-606). 
At the time of contracting, the Dygerts requested that they be provided with a 
report on the status of title of Lot 2. (RA 612). Shortly thereafter, Appellees, through 
their realtor, provided the Dygerts with a preliminary title report from Bonneville Title 
Company, Inc. ("Bonneville") that purposefully did not disclose the billboard sign lease 
as an encumbrance on Lot 2. (RA 319, 320, 348, 610). All title reports, title insurance 
commitments and title insurance policies provided thereafter to the Dygerts by Appellees 
or Bonneville failed to disclose the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance on Lot 2. (RA 
610). 
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The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove at trial that, because litigation 
had not removed the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance, Appellees decided to go 
forward with sales of lots encumbered by the billboard sign lease, anyway. (RA 319, 
348). The Dygerts have alleged and are further prepared to prove that Appellees thus 
agreed with Bonneville that Bonneville would "insure over" or "insure around" the sign 
lease. (RA 319, 320, 348). This means that the billboard sign lease would not be 
disclosed in Bonneville's title reports, title insurance commitments or title insurance 
policies as either an encumbrance affecting Clearwater Oaks' lots in the subdivision or as 
an exception to title insurance policies. Id. Consequently, the preliminary title reports, 
title insurance commitments and title insurance policy issued to the Dygerts did not 
disclose the existence of the billboard sign lease. (RA 319, 320, 348, 350, 610). 
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that both Appellees were 
aware of Bonneville's decision to "insure over" the billboard sign lease before the 
Dygerts contracted to purchase Lot 2 on May 17,2001. (RA 319, 320, 348-350, 421-
424). However, Appellees did not inform the Dygerts that Bonneville was "insuring 
over" the lease. (RA 349, 395, 610). Rather, Appellees and Bonneville affirmatively 
endeavored to conceal the existence of the billboard sign lease from the Dygerts. (RA 
319, 320, 348-350,407,408, 610). 
The Dygerts closed on Lot 2 on December 21,1999. (RA 346). Appellee Collier 
signed the Warranty Deed on behalf of Clearwater Oaks, transferring ownership of Lot 2 
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to the Dygerts that same day. (RA 330). Less than a month later, the lawsuit between 
Clearwater Oaks and the billboard sign company was settled. (RA 395,407,416,417, 
624-628). As part of that settlement, Appellee Collier, on behalf of Clearwater Oaks, 
signed and caused to be recorded a document entitled "Acknowledgment of Lease" 
which states that the lease "is in full force and effect according to its terms," except that 
the billboard sign company waived its right of first refusal to purchase the affected lots. 
(RA 402, 416,417, 619). Nevertheless, the Dygerts were never told that Appellee 
Collier had signed and recorded a document that re-affirmed the validity of the billboard 
sign lease as an encumbrance to the Dygerts' property. (RA 395). Nor did Appellees 
request or obtain the Dygerts' permission to execute and record the "Acknowledgment of 
Z^e."(RA395,410,627) . 
When Appellee Collier executed and caused to be recorded the "Acknowledgment 
of Lease" in January 2000, neither Appellees nor their LLC, Clearwater Oaks, possessed 
a legal interest in Lot 2. (RA 395,402,410, 627). 
A year and a half after purchasing their home and lot from Appellees' LLC, the 
Dygerts attempted to sell their property to Jeff and Jennifer Mabey ("the Mabeys"). On 
May 17, 2001, the Dygerts had executed all documents necessary to close on that sale 
and the Mabeys were executing their documents when the billboard sign lease was 
disclosed to the Mabeys by the title officer at the closing. (RA 321, 346). The Mabeys 
refused to close and their lender refused to lend on the purchase of the home and lot until 
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the billboard sign lease was terminated as to that property. (RA 321, 346, 347, 394, 395, 
609). May 17,2001 was the first time the Dygerts learned of the existence of the 
billboard sign lease as an encumbrance to their property. (RA 395, 610). The 
Dygerts were unable to have the billboard sign lease terminated as to Lot 2 in time to 
consummate their sale to the Mabeys, and they have suffered damages as a result. (RA 
344-362). 
In their Amended Complaint, the Dygerts sued Appellees, as individuals, for: 1) 
fraud and misrepresentation; 2) conspiracy to defraud; 3) negligent misrepresentation; 4) 
constructive trust; and 5) fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. All of these claims were 
dismissed by the court below on summary judgment. (RA 758-759). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Argument 
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees cannot be 
held liable for tortious acts they themselves committed on behalf of their limited liability 
company ("LLC")- Because Appellees individually and actively participated in the 
commission of torts that injured the Dygerts, each Appellee is personally liable to the 
Dygerts for the injuries caused thereby.2 
Second Argument 
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees did not 
personally owe a legal duty to the Dygerts. Under agency law, Appellees had a legal 
duty not to injure the Dygerts in a residential real estate transaction in which Appellees 
were acting on behalf of their own LLC.3 As members and agents of the LLC selling 
real property to the Dygerts, Appellees had a common law duty to refrain from acts that 
were reasonably risky to the Dygerts - even if those acts served the interests of the LLC.4 
As members and agents of the LLC, Appellees had a duty to disclose a known material 
defect in the property.5 Finally, as real estate developers and agents of the LLC, 
2
 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877; Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 
696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., etal, 63 P.2d 231(UT 1936). 
3
 Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star 
Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231(UT 1936). 
4
 PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368 (Cal.App.2d 2000). 
5
 Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (UT 2002). 
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Appellees owed the Dygerts a duty to supply correct information about the property 
being sold.6 Each of these duties is a legal duty that both Appellees owed to the Dygerts. 
Third Argument 
The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that, since the billboard sign 
lease was a matter of public record, the Dygerts could not justifiably rely on Appellees' 
representations about the state of title to the residential real property they had contracted 
to purchase. Appellees affirmatively misrepresented and concealed material information 
about a material defect in the real property, i.e., the existence of a billboard sign lease 
that encumbered the property. Accordingly, the Dygerts were legally justified in relying 
upon Appellees' representations of the status of title to that property7 - especially given 
that the Appellees' representations were corroborated by title reports provided by the title 
company that had conspired with Appellees to conceal the existence of the billboard sign 
lease. The Dygerts did not have a legal duty to independently search title records to 
determine whether the information Appellees provided them was correct. Id. In addition, 
justifiable reliance is generally a jury issue.8 
6
 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT 
1983). 
7
 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT 
1983); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980). 
8
 Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc., 21 P.3d 219 (UT App. 2000). 
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ARGUMENT 
On Appellees' third attempt at summary judgment or dismissal of the Dygerts' 
claims against them, the trial court accepted three of Appellees' legal assertions. First, 
the trial court accepted Appellees' contention that Appellees themselves could not be 
held personally liable for their own conduct committed on behalf of Clearwater Oaks, 
their LLC. (RA 754; Addendum A-17). Second, the trial court accepted Appellees' 
contention that Appellees did not owe a legal duty to the Dygerts because Appellees were 
acting on behalf of their LLC. Id. Third, the trial court accepted Appellees' contention 
that the Dygerts could not justifiably rely upon Appellees' representations about the state 
of title of the residential real property the Dygerts had contracted to purchase from them. 
Id. 
These issues will be addressed in order below. 
I. Appellees Are Personally Liable for Their Own Tortious Acts Committed on 
Behalf of Their LLC. 
Tort Law 
The Dygerts did not sue Appellees for acts committed by others on behalf of 
Clearwater Oaks. Nor are the Dygerts seeking to "pierce the corporate veil" or to hold 
Appellees responsible for the debts or obligations of Appellees' LLC, Clearwater Oaks. 
Rather, the Dygerts sued Appellees for the tortious acts that Appellees themselves 
committed. (RA 344-362). The Dygerts' tort claims against Appellees are based on the 
straightforward application of long-standing principles of tort law. 
20 
Throughout the proceedings below, Appellees sought refuge in the Utah Revised 
Limited Liability Company Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101 et seq, from personal 
liability for their own wrongful conduct. (RA 200, 201,452, 569). Appellees repeatedly 
cited Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-104,48-2c-l 16 and 48-2c-601 in support of their 
argument that they could not be held individually liable for the acts or obligations of their 
LLC. Id. Although this argument ultimately gained favor with the court below, it 
completely missed the point of the Dygerts' claims against Appellees. "The legal fiction 
of the corporation as an independent entity was never intended to insulate officers 
and directors from liability for their own tortious conduct."9 
The personal liability of corporate officers and directors - and members or 
managers of an LLC - for their individual wrongdoing committed on behalf of a 
business entity is clear. In Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (UT App. 1998), 
this Court acknowledged the general rule that ff[a] director is not personally liable for 
his corporation's contractual breaches unless he assumed personal liability, acted in 
bad faith or committed a tort in connection with the performance of the contract." 
(emphasis added.) Stated differently, Reedeker recognizes a tort law exception to the 
general rule of business-entity law that officers and directors are not liable for debts and 
obligations of the company. 
9
 See PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1380 (Cal.App.2d 
2000)(emphasis added). 
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The instant case involves application of the tort law exception to the general rule 
of limited liability for business entities, that is, imposing personal liability when a 
principal of a business entity himself commits a tort on behalf of the entity. This 
exception is best explained in 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 187710, which states that 
an officer or director: 
is not liable for torts committed by or for the corporation unless 
he has participated in the wrong. Accordingly, directors not 
parties to a wrongful act on the part of other directors are not liable 
therefore. If, however, a director or officer commits or 
participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also 
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third persons injured 
thereby, and it does not matter what liability attaches to the 
corporation for the tort. A contrary rule would enable a director 
or officer of a corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and 
escape liability behind the shield of his representative character, 
even though the corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible. 
.. Participation may be found not solely on the basis of direct action 
but may also consist of knowing approval or ratification of unlawful 
acts. 
That a corporate officer is acting for the corporation or within 
the scope of his employment when he participated in the 
company's commission of a tort does not affect his liability for 
the tort. 
The liability of a director or corporate officer as a participant in a 
tort is distinct from the liability resulting from the "piercing of the 
corporate veil." The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the 
owner liable, the rationale for doing so being that the corporation is 
something less than a bona fide independent entity. On the other 
hand, a director or officer who is liable as a participant in a tort 
1018B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877 is reproduced in its entirety in the 
Addendum to this brief at pages A-8 to A-12. 
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is liable as an actor rather than as an owner. His liability is in no 
way dependent on a finding that the corporation is inadequately 
capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego of himself, that 
the corporate form is being used to perpetrate a fraud, or that 
corporate formalities have not been properly complied with — the 
absence of such findings does not affect the director's or officer's 
liability, {citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
This exception to the general rule governing liability of officers and directors 
appears to be universally accepted in American jurisdictions that have addressed the 
issue. The above-quoted passage from Am.Jur.2d cites 54 cases in support and none 
opposed. (Addendum A-2 to A-6). In addition, before the hearing on Appellees' third 
attempt at summary judgment, the Dygerts provided the trial court with supplemental 
authorities in the form of an article entitled "Personal Liability of Corporate Officers" 
that had just been published in the June 2002 edition of "For The Defense" magazine.11 
This article cites more than 25 cases around the country supporting the common 
law axiom that corporate officers and directors are liable for their own tortious 
conduct, regardless whether the wrongful conduct was committed on behalf of a 
business entity.. Again, no contrary cases are cited in the article. After a national 
search of relevant jurisprudence, we have not discovered a single case supporting 
Appellees9 assertion that a member of an LLC is not personally liable for his own 
tortious conduct committed on behalf of the LLC. 
11
 The article entitled "Personal Liability of Corporate Officers" published in the 
June 2002 edition of "For The Defense" magazine is reproduced in the Addendum to this 
brief at pages A~ 13 to A-18. 
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Admittedly the instant case deals with an LLC, not a corporation. However, the 
statutory limitation of liability for members of an LLC under Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-
601 is similar in scope to the limitation of liability for shareholders of a corporation 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 and for partners in a limited liability 
partnership provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (2). 
Therefore, the same basic principles should apply. Above all else is the principle 
of limited liability, which, for LLC's, is codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-104 ("A 
company formed under this chapter is a legal entity distinct from its members."), 48-2c-
116 ("A member or manager of a company is not a proper party to proceedings by or 
against a company.") and 48-2c-601, which provides: 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a 
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a 
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or 
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
The common law of tort unambiguously imposes personal liability on corporate 
officers and directors for their own wrongdoing. Therefore, the question now before this 
Court is whether the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-101, 
et seq., establishes different liability standards for members of LLC's. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 is key to answering that question. The operative 
language of section 601 reads: "no member... is personally liable . . . for a debt, 
obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of the company or of 
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any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of the company." {Emphasis added). 
The meaning of section 601 is plain: A member is not personally liable for the acts 
of any other person on behalf of the LLC. Section 601, however, does nothing to 
alter or limit a member's common law liability under tort or agency law for the 
member's own tortious acts. Therefore the common law prevails,12 and members of 
LLC's are just as personally liable for their own wrongful acts as officers and directors 
are for theirs. Simply put, a tortfeasor is a tortfeasor wherever he may be found. 
This position is supported by commentators who have reviewed LLC enabling 
statutes around the country. See "Those Delaware LLCS-Another Look How They Could 
Work For You? Frederic J. Bendremer,10 -JUN Bus.L.Today 43, 45 (The protections 
against personal liability conferred by the act are not necessarily absolute.... Personal 
liability may also result from certain types of tortious or otherwise wrongful 
conduct "){emphasis added); "Limited Liability Companies: Issues In Member 
Liability" Karin Schwindt, 44 UCLA L.Rev. 1541, 1548 ("Regardless of one's status as 
a member of an LLC, that member cannot escape liability for her personal misconduct. 
The most obvious example is the commission of a tort. According to well-established 
tort law principles, '[a] tort is no less a tort for being committed in the service of a 
separate legal person.' If a member commits a tort while in the course of LLC 
business, she may be held personally liable for that tort."){emphasis added); "Tax-
12
 See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 
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Advantaged Securities Handbook, Chapter 12A. The Limited Liability Company" Robert 
J. Haft and Peter M. Fass, 2 Tax Adv. Sec. Handbook § 12A:7,2002 ("A member or 
manager is liable, however, for his own acts or omissions, including liability for a 
crime, a tort, or a breach of contract undertaken in his own right.")(emphasis 
added); N.J. Forms Legal & Bus. § 18A:3,2002 ("However, inherent in the concept of 
limited liability is the fact that members and managers, employees and agents, are 
not insulated from liability resulting from their own wrongdoings, such as tort or 
professional malpractice ")(emphasis added); "Asset Protection: Domestic and 
International Law And Tactics, Chapter 18 Limited Liability Companies" Duncan E. 
Osborne and Elizabeth Morgan Shurig, 2 Asset Protection: Dom. & Int'l L. & Tactics § 
18:08, 2002 ("In addition, criminal and other statutes, as well as common law 
principles, may impose liability on a member or manager who commits a crime, 
tort, or other violation while acting on behalf of a limited liability 
company. "){emphasis added)}3 
Of course, the commentators are right. "A contrary rule would enable a [member] 
of a [limited liability company] to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape liability behind 
the shield of his representative character, even though the [limited liability company] 
13
 See also Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C, 70 S.W. 3d 252 (Tex.App- San 
Antonio, 2001)(Genuine issue of material fact as to whether member of LLC had 
committed an independent tort precluded summary judgment for member in negligence 
action brought by injured employee of LLC). 
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might be insolvent or irresponsible."14 
Agency Law 
The Dygerts' case is also governed by long-standing principles of agency law. In 
Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (UT 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
If an agent commits a tort while acting on behalf of his principal, the fact 
that he is an agent does not insulate him from liability to the injured party. 
The agent's liability is determined solely upon the common-law 
obligation that every person must so act or use that which he controls 
as not to injure another.... [WJhether he is acting on his own behalf or 
for another, an agent who violates a duty which he owes to a third 
person is answerable to the injured party for the consequences. It is no 
excuse to an agent that his principal is also liable for a tort.... Nor is an 
agent who is guilty of tortious conduct relieved from liability merely 
because he acted at the request, or even at the command or direction, of the 
principal, unless he is exercising a privilege of the principal to commit the 
act. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 300 (l962)(footnotes omitted){emphasis 
added). 
Nearly fifty years before Pentecost, the Supreme Court had recognized that "the agent is 
responsible to third persons when he is negligent in the performance of the duties 
which he undertakes, whether such act be termed misfeasance or nonfeasance."15 
Tort and Agency Law 
More than twenty years ago, the United States District Court for the Northern 
1418B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877, supra; Addendum pages A-2 to A-6. 
15
 Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231, 238 (UT 
I936)(emphasis added). 
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District of California16 recognized that principals of business entities have personal 
liability under both tort and agency law theories: 
Basic principles of tort and agency law provide the starting point for 
defining those circumstances. An agent "who does an act otherwise 
a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the 
command of the principal or on account of the principal." Applied 
to corporations, this rule of agency law means that "(a)n officer 
or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he 
authorizes or directs or in which he participates, 
notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation 
and not on his own behalf.'1 Courts have, however, consistently 
stated that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, 
merely by virtue of his office, for the torts of his corporation. 
Personal liability must be founded upon specific acts by the 
individual director or officer, {citations omitted)(emphasis added) 
Under the rules of tort and agency, Appellees would be liable to the Dygerts 
if a jury finds that Appellees committed the tortious acts alleged in the Dygerts5 
Amended Complaint. As the only two members of their LLC, Appellees effectively 
stood in the position of officers and directors of that business entity. And, as noted 
above, members of an LLC are just as liable under tort law for their own misdeeds as are 
corporate officers and directors. Therefore, the principles of officer and director liability 
set forth in 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877, supra, apply to Appellees. 
In addition, Appellees were acting as members and agents of their LLC in their 
interactions with, and conduct toward, the Dygerts. As agents of the LLC, Appellees are 
l6Murphey Tugboat Co., Ltd. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., Ltd, 467 
F.Supp. 841, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1979), ajfd 658 F.2d 1256,1257 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied, 455 U.S. 1018, 102 S.Ct. 1713 (1982). 
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subject to the venerable principles of agency liability set forth in Pentecost v. M. W. 
Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985) and Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 
P.2d231(UT1936). 
In reviewing the rulings of the court below, this Court must consider the facts and 
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the Dygerts.17 In their Amended 
Complaint, memoranda and exhibits submitted to the court below, the Dygerts have 
alleged and are prepared to prove at trial that: 
• Appellees personally knew the billboard sign lease encumbered Lot 2 
before and after the Dygerts purchased the property (RA 347, 408, 414-
417); 
• Appellees personally knew that disclosure of the lease to the Dygerts would 
likely cause the Dygerts to refuse to close on their purchase of Lot 2, as the 
Clausings had done a year earlier (RA 323, 324, 348, 411); 
Appellees personally knew that their LLC had filed a lawsuit against the 
billboard sign company before the Dygerts contracted to purchase Lot 2 
and that the lawsuit continued until after the Dygerts closed on the 
purchase of the property (RA 348, 349, 395,407, 411, 414-417); 
• Appellees personally knew that the billboard sign lease was a material 
17
 Low v. City ofMonticello, 54 P.3d 1153, 1157 (UT 2002)("Additionally, when 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment," fwe view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1") 
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defect - "something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether to 
buy or sell."18 - affecting Lot 2 before and after the Dygerts contracted to 
purchase their property (RA 323, 324, 348); 
Appellees personally conspired among themselves and with Bonneville to 
conceal information about the billboard sign lease (RA 348, 349, 352-355); 
Appellees personally knew that Bonneville had agreed to "insure over" the 
lease encumbrance to Lot 2 and therefore would issue preliminary title 
reports and title commitments that did not disclose the existence of the 
billboard sign lease (Id.); 
Appellees personally knew that Bonneville Title Company would issue a 
title insurance policy that did not list the billboard sign lease as an 
exception to the policy (RA 348, 349); 
Appellee Youngberg intentionally provided the Dygerts a copy of a plat 
map showing that the billboard sign lease only encumbered Lot 5, where 
the billboard is conspicuously located, when Appellee Youngberg knew 
that the lease also encumbered Lot 2 (RA 319, 377, 378, 389,408, 411); 
At the time of contracting, Appellee Youngberg completed, signed and 
provided the Dygerts with a completed form document entitled "Seller's 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (UT 2002). 
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Property Condition Disclosure (Land)" in which he affirmatively 
misrepresented that there was no ongoing litigation affecting Lot 2, that 
there were no undisclosed easements affecting Lot 2, and that there was 
nothing that should be disclosed that materially or adversely affected the 
value of Lot 2 (RA 391, 392); 
Appellees, at the Dygerts' request and through their realtor, provided the 
Dygerts with a preliminary title report from Bonneville that purposefully 
did not disclose the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance on Lot 2 (RA 
608-610); 
Appellees never told the Dygerts about the billboard sign lease affecting 
Lot 2 or the litigation over the billboard sign lease as it affected Lot 2 
before or after the Dygerts purchased Lot 2 (RA 395); 
On December 21,1999, Appellee Collier signed a Warranty Deed 
conveying Lot 2 to the Dygerts (RA 330); 
In January 2000, Appellee Collier, without the Dygerts' knowledge and 
consent, signed and caused to be filed an "Acknowledgment of Lease" that 
re-affirmed the validity of the billboard sign lease as an encumbrance to 
Lot 2 (RA 395,402, 410,416, 417); 
In May 2001, the Dygerts sale of their property (Lot 2 and a house) failed 
when the buyers learned at closing of the existence of the billboard sign 
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lease and walked out of the closing transaction (RA 321, 346, 347, 394, 
395); 
• In May 2001, the buyers' lender refused to lend on the sale of the Dygerts' 
property until the billboard sign lease was terminated as an encumbrance 
on that property (RA 395); and 
• The Dygerts have been injured and their injuries were proximately caused 
by Appellees' tortious conduct (RA 344-362). 
Therefore, the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees 
could not be held liable to the Dygerts for acts Appellees' committed on behalf of their 
LLC, Clearwater Oaks. 
II. Appellees Individually Owed Multiple Duties to the Dygerts, Including: 1) A 
Duty Not to Injure: 2) A Duty to Refrain from Acts that Were Reasonably 
Risky: 3) A Duty to Disclose a Material Defect: and 4) A Duty to Supply 
Correct Information. 
Duty Not To Injure 
As set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the common law duty 
of an agent to a third party with whom the agent transacts on behalf of a principal.19 
Duty To Refrain From Risky Acts 
Other courts have gone a step further, specifically addressing the duty a principal 
of a business entity owes to persons with whom the principal deals on behalf of the 
19
 Pentecost v. M. W. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (UT 1985); Kaumans v. White Star 
Gas & Oil Co., et al, 63 P.2d 231, 238 (UT 1936). 
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entity. For example, the California Second District Court of Appeals in PMC, Inc. v. 
Kadisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1381 (2000), stated: 
A corporate officer or director, like any other person, owes a 
duty to refrain from injuring others. In the context of a 
negligence claim, the Supreme Court has held that, like any other 
person, "directors individually owe a duty of care, independent of 
the corporate entity's own duty, to refrain from acting in a manner 
that creates an unreasonable risk of personal injury to third parties.11. 
. . Stated differently, the Supreme Court held: "Like any other 
citizen, corporate officers have a societal duty to refrain from 
acts that are reasonably risky to third persons even when their 
shareholders or creditors would agree that such conduct serves 
the institution's best interests, {emphasis added; citations omitted) 
Duty to Disclose Known Material Defects 
In Utah "sellers of real property owe a duty to disclose material known defects 
that cannot be discovered by a reasonable inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer."20 
Appellees, however, chose to do just the opposite. Behind the shield of their LLC, they 
made affirmatively misleading statements to, and concealed material information from, 
the Dygerts about the existence of the billboard sign lease. 
Duty to Supply Correct Information 
Appellees are real estate developers who owed the Dygerts a distinct duty to 
supply correct information about Lot 2. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT 1983). In Christenson, the Supreme Court recognized 
20
 Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241 (UT 2002), citing Mitchell v. 
Christensen, 31 P.3d 572. 
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that a person who is involved in a real estate transaction - but not as a party - may have a 
duty to supply accurate information to the buyer even though the person is not in privity 
with the buyer, stating: "If, however, 'the information is given in the capacity of one in 
the business of supplying such information, that care and diligence should be exercised 
which is compatible with the particular business or profession involved.'" Id. at 305. 
In the instant case, Appellees are developers who deal in the business of 
developing and selling real property. Because they sold real estate to the Dygerts 
through their LLC, Appellees were not individually in privity with the Dygerts in the 
transaction. Nevertheless, because of their superior position as developers with 
specialized knowledge about real estate transactions, Appellees owed the Dygerts "the 
duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity of the information" they provided the 
Dygerts. Id. 
The court below erred by concluding as a matter of law that Appellees did not 
personally owe a duty to the Dygerts. 
III. The Dygerts Justifiably Relied Upon Appellees Misrepresentations About 
The True State Of Title To The Property They Were Purchasing. 
The law in Utah is crystal clear on this issue. A buyer may justifiably rely on a 
seller's statements about the true state of title to real property because a buyer has no duty 
to examine official title records in the recorder's office to determine whether the seller's 
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representations are true.21 In Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co,, 
666 P.2d 302,3Q7 (UT 1983), the Supreme Court held: 
Generally a failure to examine public records does not defeat an 
action for a false representation because in most cases there is no 
duty to make such an examination. 37 AmJur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 
263 (1968). Thus, it has been held in fraud cases that a plaintiff who 
contracts to buy property is under no duty to examine public records 
to ascertain the true state of title claimed by the seller. 
Moreover, a buyer has no duty to look behind the seller's statements about real 
property when the buyer has no indication there is a problem with the seller's 
representations about the property.22 Likewise, a buyer is not barred from recovering 
from the seller on a fraud claim simply because the buyer had the opportunity to 
investigate the truth of the seller's representations and chose not to.23 As long as the 
Dygerts did not undertake to independently search the title records on Lot 2 before their 
purchase, they could rely on Appellees' representations.24 
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove that Appellees affirmatively 
misrepresented and concealed the true state of title of Lot 2. First, Appellee Youngberg 
v21 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302 (UT 
1983). 
22Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1246 (UT 1980)("[A] vendee of real property, 
in the absence of facts putting him on notice, has no duty to investigate to determine 
whether the vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed."). 
23
 Id. ("Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering in an action for deceit because 




provided the Dygerts with a copy of a plat map showing a cross-hatched portion of Lot 5, 
indicating that the billboard sign lease only affected that lot. The Dygerts are prepared to 
prove that, at the time he showed the Dygerts the misleading plat map, Appellee 
Youngberg personally knew that the billboard sign lease affected all the lots his LLC was 
attempting to sell, including Lot 2. 
Then, at the time of contracting (May 17,1999), Appellee Youngberg provided 
the Dygerts with a form real estate document entitled "Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosure (Land)" in which he affirmatively misrepresented that there was no ongoing 
litigation affecting Lot 2, that there were no undisclosed easements affecting Lot 2, and 
that there was nothing that should be disclosed that materially or adversely affected the 
value of Lot 2. 
Also at the time of contracting, the Dygerts requested that they be provided with a 
preliminary title report, showing the status of title for Lot 2. Appellees knew that 
Bonneville would issue a title report, but the title report would conceal the existence of 
the billboard sign lease. Approximately a week after they made their request for such a 
report, the Dygerts were provided a preliminary title report by Clearwater Oaks' realtor. 
Neither that report nor any other title report, title commitment or title insurance policy 
thereafter provided to the Dygerts revealed the existence of the billboard sign lease as a 
material encumbrance on Lot 2. 
The Dygerts did not independently search title records or retain a qualified person 
36 
to search title records to determine whether the information provided by Appellees was 
correct. They were under no duty to do so.25 Together, Christenson and Dugan stand 
for the proposition that a buyer of real property does not have legal duty to ferret out 
fraud when such buyer has no notice or other indication of potentially fraudulent activity 
by the seller. A buyer may reasonably rely on the representations of the seller. 
There is great wisdom in the common law. The pure caveat emptor approach 
espoused by Appellees, and accepted by the court below, would wreak havoc on real 
estate transactions in this state. Prudent buyers, looking for fraud in every transaction, 
would not be able to accept as true any information provided by sellers. A prudent 
buyer, to protect herself from defects in title, would not be able to rely upon title reports 
prepared by a title company like the Dygerts did. Instead, she would be forced to hire a 
lawyer to issue a title opinion. Many of the standard practices we take for granted in real 
property transactions in Utah would end, making such deals more difficult and 
expensive. 
Constructive Notice Not Applicable 
The trial court's ruling that the Dygerts cannot demonstrate justifiable reliance 
suggests that the court believed the Dygerts were on constructive notice about the 
fraudulent nature of Appellees' actions merely because the billboard sign lease was 
25
 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 666 P.2d 302, (UT 
1983) and Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980). 
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recorded. But the fact that an instrument regarding an interest in real property is 
recorded is not, by itself, sufficient to put a party on notice of fraudulent conduct. In 
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188,1195 (UT 1993), the Supreme Court stated: 
'Mere constructive notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for 
record is not notice of the facts constituting fraud.' Recording a 
deed or entering judgment alone is not enough in some instances to 
apprise a party of the fraudulent nature of a conveyance. 
Since the Dygerts did not have a duty to search the title records,26 they cannot be 
charged with constructive notice of a fraud perpetrated by Appellees. 
Justifiable Reliance Is Jury Issue 
The trial court's conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Dygerts "cannot 
demonstrate a justifiable reliance" on information provided by Appellees invades the 
province of the jury.27 Therefore, this conclusion should be reversed. 
26
 Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co,, 666 P.2d 302, (UT 
1983) and Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (UT 1980). 
27
 Robinson v. Tripco Investments, Inc., 21 P.3d 219, 224 (UT App. 2000)("[T]he 
question of whether a plaintiff was reasonable in his or her reliance is 'usually a matter 
within the province of the jury.'"). 
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CONCLUSION 
This is a "garden variety" fraud case.28 Appellees should not be given safe harbor 
under their LLC from the consequences of their wrongful conduct. Neither the 
legislature nor the common law has intended to countenance such protections. 
Accordingly, the Dygerts respectfully request that this Honorable Court reverse 
the trial court's order granting summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court 
with directions to set a jury trial on all counts alleged against Appellees in the Dygerts' 
Amended Complaint. 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2003. 
BEARNSON & PECK, LC 
v-
V»»»-*-"* " ^ ^ — ^ 
Marty E. Moore 
Attorneys for Daniel K. and Stephanie C. 
Dygert 
28
 Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,770 (UT 1985)("[T]hese facts present 
something of a 'garden variety' fraud case, in which one part intentionally or recklessly 
misrepresents a presently existing material fact, thereby inducing another to reasonably 
rely and act upon that falsehood to the other's detriment."). 
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Civil No. 010800994 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court for oral argument n August 20,2002. The Court, having taken the matter 
under advisement, rendered its decision on September 17, 2002 via telephone conference. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their attorney, Marty Moore, and Defendants Collier and 
Youngberg were represented by their attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed 
Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion and supplemental Memoranda and Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum, the other pleadings and papers on file herein, the Court having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
A - l 
•"•BBC, 
1. Defendants Collier and Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendants Collier and Youngberg is dismissed. 
DATED this (f^ day of Qt$r. , 2002 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARTY E. MOORE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
HONORABLE GLEN R. DA] 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF M An X^C. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to Brad N. Beamson and 
Marty E. Moore, BEARNSON & PECK, L.C., 74 West 100 North, Logan, Utah 84321, and 
StephenF. Noel, SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, 4723 HarrisonBlvd. #200, Ogden, Utah 
84403, postage prepaid, this ? P day of September, 2002. 
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111 East 300 South, Suite 370 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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OCT 1 0 2002 
c.: 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 




CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
BONNEVILLE TITLE COMPANY, INC.; 
CLEARWATER OAKS, L.C.; ALAN M. 
COLLIER; and MIKE YOUNGBERG, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010800994 
Judge Glen R. Dawson 
Defendants, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg's, Motion for Summary Judgment came 
before the Court for oral argument on August 20,2002. The Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement, rendered its decision on September 17,2002 via telephone conference. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Marty Moore, and Defendants Collier and Youngberg were represented 
by their attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed Defendants Collier and 
Youngberg's Motion and supplemental Memoranda and Plaintiffs' Memorandum, the other 
pleadings and papers on file herein, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was organized and its Articles of Organization were 
filed with the Utah State Department of Commerce on November 28,1997, and was, at all times 
relevant hereto, a valid existing limited liability company in good standing with the State of Utah. 
A-3 
2. Defendants Alan Collier and Mike Youngberg were, at all times relevant hereto, the 
members of Clearwater Oaks, L.C. 
3. Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was the owner of a subdivision located in Davis 
County, State of Utah known as the "Clearwater Oaks Subdivision" (the "Subdivision"). 
4. At no time did either Defendant Collier or Defendant Youngberg personally own the 
Subdivision. 
5. Plaintiffs purchased a certain lot in the Subdivision from Defendant Clearwater Oaks, 
L-C described as Lot 2, Clearwater Oaks Subdivision (the "Property")-
6. The purchase of the Property by Plaintifls from Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was 
an arm's length transaction. 
7. The individual Defendants did not sign personally any documents related to the sale 
of the Property to Plaintifls. 
8. At the time the Plaintiffs purchased the Property from Defendant Clearwater Oaks, 
L.C, there was a lease affecting the Property in favor of Reagan Sign Company (the "Lease") which 
was recorded as Entry No. 1127166, Book 1773, Page 460 in the office of the Davis County 
Recorder on the 17th day of May 1994. 
9. Neither Defendant Collier nor Defendant Youngberg individually had a legal duty to 
Plaintiffs in the sale of the Property from Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. to Plaintiffs. 
10. Utah Code Ann. § Ann. §48-2c-104 {The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company 
Act] provides: 
A company formed under this chapter is a legal entity distinct from 
its members. 
11. Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-l 16 provides: 
A member or manager of a company is not a proper party to 
proceedings by or against a company, except when the object is to 




12. Utah Code Ann, §48-2c-601 provides: 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a 
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a 
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or 
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
13. Utah fYirte Ann. §57-3-102(1) provides in relevant part: 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title.,... shall from the time of recording with the 
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their 
contents. 
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now make and enter the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendants Collier and Youngberg as member of Clearwater Oaks, L.L.C. cannot be 
held personally liable for the acts of Defendant Clearwater Oaks. 
2. Defendants Collier and Youngberg individually did not have a legal duty to the 
Plaintiffs in the sale of the Property by Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C, to Plaintiffs. 
3. Plaintiffs had legal notice of the Lease at the time they purchased the Property. 
4. Because the Lease the Plaintiffs claim encumbered the Property was a public record, 
the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a justifiable reliance and therefore the causes of action against 
Defendants Collier and Youngberg must be dismissed. 
5. Defendants Collier and Youngberg are not proper parties to the litigation and the 
causes of action against them personally should be dismissed. 
3A-5 
DATED this °\ day o£September, 2002 
BY THE COURT: 
MARTY E. MOORE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to Brad N. Bearason and Marty E. Moore, BEARNSON & PECK, L.C., 74 West 100 North, 
Logan, Utah 84321 and StephenF. Noel, SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, 4723 Harrison Blvd. 
#200, Ogden, Utah 84403, postage prepaid, this U day of September, 2002. 
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AMJUR CORPORATNS S 1877 
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1877 (1985) 
Pagel 
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition 
Current through the May 2001 Cumulative Supplement 
Corporations 
Anne Christine Haberle, J.D.; James L. Jones, J.D.; Jack K. Levin, J.D.; Eric 
Mayer, J.D.; Jody L. Mikasen, J.D.; Leonard I. Reiser, J.D.; Ferdinand S. 
Tinio, LL.B., LL.M. 
XVI. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Directors, Officers, and Employees 
[§§1684-1989] 
P. Liability to Third Persons for Torts of Corporation F§§ 1877-1891] 
1. In General [§§1877, 1878] 
Topic Summary; Topic Contents; Parallel References; List of Topics; 
§ 1877. GENERALLY 
A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his 
official character; he is not liable for torts committed by or for the corporation unless he has participated in the 
wrong. [FN79] Accordingly, directors not parties to a wrongful act on the part of other directors are not liable 
therefor. [FN80] If, however, a director or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or 
not it is also by or for the corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what 
liability attaches to the corporation for the tort. A contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a corporation 
to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape liability behind the shield of his representative character, even though the 
corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible. [FN81] Liability under those conditions may be recognized by 
statute. [FN82] Participation may be found not solely on the basis of direct action but may also consist of knowing 
approval or ratification of unlawful acts. [FN83] 
Caution: That a corporate officer is acting for the corporation or within the scope of his employment when he 
participated in the company's commission of a tort does not affect his liability for the tort. [FN84] 
Observation: The liability of a director or corporate officer as a participant in a tort is distinct from the 
liability resulting from the "piercing of the corporate veil." The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the 
owner liable, the rationale for doing so being that the corporation is something less than a bona fide independent 
entity. [FN85] On the other hand, a director or officer who is liable as a participant in a tort is liable as an actor 
rather than as an owner. His liability is in no way dependent on a finding that the corporation is inadequately 
capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego of himself, that the corporate form is being used to perpetrate 
a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been properly complied with-the absence of such findings does not 
affect the directors or officer's liability. [FN86] 
If, because of the tort committed by an officer or agent of a corporation, the corporation becomes liable also, 
such individual and the corporation are jointly liable and may be joined as defendants. [FN87] 
Practice guide: If a director or officer is sought to be held individually liable for a tort committed by the 
corporation, he must be made a party in the action against the company. Otherwise, the director or officer cannot 
be held personally liable without an opportunity to relitigate the issue of the amount of damages. [FN88] 
Certain aspects of the liability of corporate officers or agents with respect to particular torts are discussed in the 
following sections. [FN89] Treated elsewhere is their liability for assault and battery, [FN90] conversion, [FN91] 
trespass, [FN92] libel, [FN93] maintaining a nuisance, [FN94] and the infringement of copyrights or patents. 
[FN95] 
Practice guide: In a suit against a corporation for tort, a corporate officer who is not a resident of the state 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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where the corporation is alleged to have committed the tort (and which is thus the proper forum) may be brought 
within the court's long-arm jurisdiction on the theory that he is personally liable for the tort. [FN96] 
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT by the editorial staff of the Publishers. 
Research References: 
Validity, construction, and application of "fiduciary shield" doctrine- modern cases, 79 A.L.R. 5th 587. 
Supreme Court's views as to validity, construction, and application of Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. §§9601 et seq.), 157 A.L.R. Fed. 291. 
Liability of dissolved corporation or corporation that forfeited charter in action pursuant to Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A {$ 9601-9675), 123 A.L.R. 
Fed. 461. 
Liability of individual shareholder, or director of corporation that owned contaminating facility in action 
pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. 
§§9601- 9675), 122 A.L.R. Fed. 321. 
"Can they take my house?": Defending directors and officers, 81 111 BJ May:244 (1993). 
Coolley, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors In Intellectual Property Actions? 33 Prac Law 
79, June, 1987. 
Corporate officer liability as an operator under CERCLA, 9 J Nat Resour and Environ L 2:553 (1994). 
Defamation, freedom of speech and corporations, 1993 Juridicial Rev 294 (1993). 
Environmental crime and punishment; New proposed guidelines for evaluating corporate culpability, 17 Los 
Angeles Law 7:20 (1994). 
Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in a Special Context. 65 Bos U LR 967, November, 
1985. 
Unpacking limited liability: Direct and vicarious liability of corporate participants for torts of the enterprise, 47 
VandLR 1(1994). 
Cases: 
Where a third party who entered into a contract with a corporation brought suit against the president-director of 
the corporation alleging tortious interference with contract, the president-director was not shielded from liability 
for tortious interference because the president-director only owned 40 percent of the corporation and lacked the 
unity of financial interest that would warrant considering him the same entity as the corporation. Holloway v 
Skinner (1993, Tex App Austin) 860 SW2d 217, writ of error filed (Oct 26, 1993). 
[FN79]. Numerous decisions from many jurisdictions support this rule, including the following representative 
cases: Washington Gas Light Co. v Lansden, 172 US 534, 43 L Ed 543, 19 S Ct 296; Shingleton v Armor Velvet 
Corp. (CA5 Ga) 621 F2d 180, 6 Fed Rules Evid Serv 685; Escude Cruz v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (CA1 
Puerto Rico) 619 F2d 902; Martin v Wood (CA3 Pa) 400 F2d 310; Zubik v Zubik (CA3 Pa) 384 F2d 267, cert 
den 390 US 988, 19 L Ed 2d 1291, 88 S Ct 1183; Polo Fashions, Inc. v Branded Apparel Merchandising, Inc. 
(DC Mass) 592 F Supp 648, 225 USPQ 480; United States v ACB Sales & Service, Inc. (DC Ariz) 590 F Supp 
561; Candy H. v Redemption Ranch, Inc. (MD Ala) 563 F Supp 505; Hamilton Bank & Trust Co. v Holliday 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(ND Ga) 469 F Supp 1229, CCH Fed Secur L Rep 196953; Murphy Tugboat Co. v Shipowners & Merchants. 
Towboat Co. (ND Cal) 467 F Supp 841, 1979-1 CCH Trade Case? 162527, affd (CA9 Cal) 658 F2d 1256, 1981-1 
CCH Trade Cases f64000, cert den 455 US 1018, 72 L Ed 2d 135, 102 S Ct 1713; Smith v Fidelity Mut. Life 
Ins. Co, (SD NY) 444 F Supp 594; Independence Tube Corp. v Copperweld Corp. (ND 111) 74 FRD 462, 1977-1 
CCH Trade Cases H61416, 23 FR Serv 2d 736; Re Wade (F BC ND 111) 26 BR 477; Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438 So 
2d 1375; United States Liability Ins. Co. v Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal 3d 586, 83 Cal Rptr 418, 463 P2d 770; 
Middlesex Ins. Co. v Mann (4th Dist) 124 Cal App 3d 558, 177 Cal Rptr 495; Dunbar v Finegold (Colo App) 501 
P2d 144; Scribner v O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn 389, 363 A2d 160; Gordon Finance, Inc. v Belzaguy (Fla App D3) 
216 So 2d 240; McLanahan v Keith, 135 Ga App 117, 217 SE2d 420; Rodriguez v Nishiki, 65 Hawaii 430, 653 
P2d 1145, 9 Media L R 1349; Cahill v Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P2d 1356; Fure v 
Sherman Hospital, 55 111 App 3d 572, 13 111 Dec 448, 371 NE2d 143; American Independent Management 
Systems, Inc. v McDaniel (Ind App) 443 NE2d 98; Bowling v Holdeman (Ind App) 413 NE2d 1010; Kansas 
Com. on Civil Rights v Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan 20, 660 P2d 549, 32 CCH EPr f 33632; Galvan v 
McCollister, 224 Kan 415, 580 P2d 1324; Moak v Link-Belt Co. (La App 4th Cir) 229 So 2d 395, revd on other 
grounds 257 La 281, 242 So 2d 515; Baranowski v Strating, 72 Mich App 548, 250 NW2d 744; Patzman v 
Howey, 340 Mo II, 100 SW2d 851; Boyd v Wimes (Mo App) 664 SW2d 596; Robbins v Panitz, 61 NY2d 967, 
475 NYS2d 274, 463 NE2d 615; Conneil v Hayden (2d Dept) 83 App Div 2d 30, 443 NYS2d 383; Air Traffic 
Conference, Div. of Air Transport Asso. v Marina Travel, Inc., 69 NC App 179, 316 SE2d 642; Schollmeyer v 
Saxowsky (ND) 211 NW2d 377; Schaefer v D & J Produce, Inc., 62 Ohio App 2d 53, 16 Ohio Ops 3d 108, 403 
NE2d 1015, motion overr; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86; Hunt v Rabon, 275 SC 475, 
272 SE2d 643; Zang v Leonard (Term App) 643 SW2d 657; Cooper v Cordova Sand & Gravel Co. (Tenn App) 
485 SW2d 261; Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v Stewart (Tex App Houston (1st Dist)) 668 SW2d 727, writ dism w 
o j ; Grayson v Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wash 2d 548, 599 P2d 1271; Cato v Silling, 137 W Va 694, 73 SE2d 731, 
cert den 348 US 981, 99 L Ed 764, 75 S Ct 572, reh den 349 US 924, 99 L Ed 1256, 75 S Ct 659; Kiel v Frank 
Shoe Mfg. Co., 245 Wis 292, 14 NW2d 164, 152 ALR 691. 
Specific direction or sanction of, or active participation or co-operation in, a positively wrongful act of 
commission or omission which operates to the injury or prejudice of the complaining party, is necessary to 
generate individual liability in damages of an officer or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation. 
Lobato v Pay Less Drug Stores, Inc. (CA10 NM) 261 F2d 406. 
The mere fact that a corporation, through its board of directors, approves a transaction which it should have 
reason to believe is illegal, does not of itself bring personal liability on the president of the corporation. Alliegro v 
Pan American Bank (Fla App D3) 136 So 2d 656, cert den (Fla) 149 So 2d 45. 
As to liability of officers or directors for participation in issuance of securities in violation of state securities 
laws, see§ 516. 
[FN80]. Smith v Cornelius, 41 W Va 59, 23 SE 599. 
[FN81]. Representative of the numerous cases in support of this principle are the following: Escude Cruz v Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. (CA1 Puerto Rico) 619 F2d 902; L. C. L. Theatres, Inc. v Columbia Pictures Industries, 
Inc. (CA5 Tex) 619 F2d 455; Zubik v Zubik (CA3 Pa) 384 F 2d 267, cert den 390 US 988, 19 L Ed 2d 1291, 88 
S Ct 1183; Polo Fashions, Inc. v Branded Apparel Merchandising, Inc. (DC Mass) 592 F Supp 648, 225 USPQ 
480; United States v Wade (ED Pa) 577 F Supp 1326; Pocahontas First Corp. v Venture Planning Group, Inc. 
(DC Nev) 572 F Supp 503; All American Car Wash, Inc. v National Pride Equipment, Inc. (WD Okla) 550 F 
Supp 166; Polyglycoat Corp. v C. P. C. Distributors, Inc. (SD NY) 534 F Supp 200; Citronelle-Mobile 
Gathering, Inc. v O'Leary (SD Ala) 499 F Supp 871; MacMillan Co. v I.V.O.W. Corp. (DC Vt) 495 F Supp 
1134, 209 USPQ 739; Grove Press, Inc. v Central Intelligence Agency (SD NY) 483 F Supp 132; Re Firestone 
(F BC SD Fla) 26 BR 706; Re Inforex, Inc. (F BC DC Mass) 26 BR 515, 9 BCD 1373; Alabama Music Co. v 
Nelson, 282 Ala 517, 213 So 2d 250; Chandler v Hunter (Ala App) 340 So 2d 818, 21 UCCRS 484; Rhoads v 
Harvey Publications, Inc. (App) 124 Ariz 406, 604 P2d 670, later app (App) 131 Ariz 267, 640 P2d 198; 
Jabczenski v Southern Pacific Memorial Hospital, Inc. (App) 119 Ariz 15, 579 P2d 53; Wyatt v Union Mortg. 
Co., 24 Cal 3d 773, 157 Cal Rptr 392, 598 P2d 45; Middlesex Ins. Co. v Mann (4th Dist) 124 Cal App 3d 558, 
177 Cal Rptr 495; Mayes v Sturdy Northern Sales, Inc. (1st Dist) 91 Cal App 3d 69, 154 Cal Rptr 43; Dunbar v 
Finegold (Colo App) 501 P2d 144; Scribner v O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn 389, 363 A2d 160; Naranja Lakes 
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Condominium No. One, Inc. v Rizzo (Fla App D3) 422 So 2d 1080, later app (Fla App D3) 463 So 2d 378, 10 
FLW 245; Orlovsky v Solid Surf, Inc. (Fla App D4) 405 So 2d 1363; Lincoln Land Co. v Palfery, 130 Ga App 
407, 203 SE2d 597; National Acceptance Co. v Pintura Corp., 94 III App 3d 703, 50 111 Dec 120, 418 NE2d 
1114; Stansell v International Fellowship, Inc., 22 111 App 3d 959, 318 NE2d 149; Howard Dodge & Sons, Inc. v 
Finn, 181 Ind App 209, 391 NE2d 638, 26 UCCRS 886; Grefe v Ross (Iowa) 231 NW2d 863; Kansas Com. on 
Civil Rights v Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan 20, 660 P2d 549, 32 CCH EPI • 33632; Henkin, Inc. v Berea 
Bank & Trust Co. (Ky App) 566 SW2d 420, 23 UCCRS 1225; H. B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v Bernard (La) 318 
So 2d 9, later app (La App 4th Cir) 355 So 2d 1027; Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md 295, 
340 A2d 225; Levi v Schwartz, 201 Md 575, 95 A2d 322, 36 ALR2d 1241; La Clair v Silverline Mfg. Co., 379 
Mass 21, 393 NE2d 867; Trail Clinic, P.C. v Bloch, 114 Mich App 700, 319 NW2d 638; Morgan v Eaton's 
Dude Ranch, 307 Minn 280, 239 NW2d 761, 90 ALR3d 912; Little v Grizzly Mfg., 195 Mont 419, 636 P2d 839, 
32 UCCRS 1087; Bernier Bros., Inc. v Biron, 109 NH 555, 258 A2d 339; Pacific & Atlantic Shippers, Inc. v 
Schier, 109 NH 551, 258 A2d 351; Trustees of Structural Steel & Ornamental Iron Workers Fund v Huber, 136 
NJ Super 501, 347 A2d 10, certif den 70 NJ 143, 358 A2d 190; Robbins v Panitz, 61 NY2d 967, 475 NYS2d 
274, 463 NE2d 615; Connell v Hayden (2d Dept) 83 App Div 2d 30, 443 NYS2d 383; Bernstein v Polo Fashions, 
Inc. (1st Dept) 55 App Div 2d 530, 389 NYS2d 368; United Artists Records, Inc. v Eastern Tape Corp., 19 NC 
App 207, 198 SE2d 452, 179 USPQ 824, 1973-2 CCH Trade Case: -74738; Stuart v National Indem. Co., 7 
Ohio App 3d 63, 7 Ohio BR 76, 454 NE2d 158; Stony Ridge Hill Condominium Owners Assn. v Auerbach, 64 
Ohio App 2d 40, 18 Ohio Ops 3d 26, 410 NE2d 782, motion overr; Beri, Inc. v Salishan Properties, Inc., 282 Or 
569, 580 P2d 173; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86; Amabile v Auto Kleen Car Wash, 
249 Pa Super 240, 376 A2d 247; Hunt v Rabon, 275 SC 475, 272 SE2d 643; Brungard v Caprice Records, Inc. 
(Tenn App) 608 SW2d 585; Gardner Machinery Corp. v U. C. Leasing, Inc. (Tex Civ App Beaumont) 561 SW2<i 
897, writ granted; Wichita Falls Grain Co. v Taylor Foundry Co. (Tex App Fort Worth) 649 SW2d 7 
While a director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his 
official character, yet a director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act done, or 
participates or operates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may also attach to 
the corporation for the tort. Evans v Rohrbach, 35 NJ Super 260, 113 A2d 838. 
[FN82]. Admiral Corp. v Cohen, 68 Misc 2d 687, 327 NYS2d 422. 
[FN83J. Murphy Tugboat Co. v Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co. (ND Cal) 467 F Supp 841, 1979-1 CCH 
Trade Cases 162527, affd (CA9 Cal) 658 F2d 1256, 1981-1 CCH Trade Case: • 64000, cert den 455 US 1018, 72 
L Ed 2d 135, 102 S Ct 1713. 
[FN84]. Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438 So 2d 1375; Littman v Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (Fla App D3) 425 So 2d 
636, 35 UCCRS 678; Orlovsky v Solid Surf, Inc. (Fla App D4) 405 So 2d 1363; Adams v Brickell Townhouse, 
Inc. (Fla App D3) 388 So 2d 1279; Bush v Belenke (Fla App D3) 381 So 2d 315; Dade Roofing & Insulation 
Corp. v Torres (Fla App D3) 369 So 2d 98; Cic Leasing Corp. v Dade Linen & Furniture Co. (Fla App D3) 279 
So 2d 73; Warren Tool Co. v Stephenson, 11 Mich App 274, 161 NW2d 133, 5 UCCRS 1017. 
[FN85]. Generally, as to disregard of the corporate entity, see §§ 43 et seq. 
[FN86]. Donsco, Inc. v Casper Corp. (CA3 Pa) 587 F2d 602, 199 USPQ 705; Wicks v Milzoco Builders, Inc., 
503 Pa 614, 470 A2d 86. 
The rule under which a director or officer may be held liable as a participant in a tort does not depend on the 
same grounds as "piercing the corporate veil," that is, inadequate capitalization, use of the corporate form for 
fraudulent purposes, or failure to comply with the formalities of corporate organization. Crigler v Salac (Ala) 438 
So 2d 1375. 
[FN87]. § 2124. 
[FN88]. Dunbar v Finegold (Colo App) 501 P2d 144. 
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[FN89]. As to fraud, see §§ 1882 et seq. 
As to negligence, see §§ 1889 et seq. 
[FN90]. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery § 126. 
[FN91]. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Conversion § 73. 
[FN92]. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass § 75. 
[FN93]. 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slandei § 329. 
[FN94]. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances § 58. 
[FN95]. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Propert) {{198, 199; 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Patent j 410. 
[FN96]. Lee B. Stern & Co. v Green (Fla App D3) 398 So 2d 918. 
Copyright (c) 2001 West Group. All rights reserved 
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^"ticcng the (Consequences 
Personal Liability of 
Corporate Officers 
by C. Erik Gustafson 
Ftmc oong many other purposes, businesses 
elect to form as a corporation to shield indi-
viduals from personal liability. That continues 
to be the fundamental lesson in law school 
Corporations classes, and that appears to be 
the publicly accepted wisdom. Indeed, from the 
clamor in the popular press to "change" the 
law to allow individuals to be held personally 
liable for such business failures as Enron, one 
would think that an individual, such as an officer 
of the corporation, may not be found personally 
liable when his or her actions are cloaked in the 
name of the corporation. Of course, nothing 
could be further from the truth—business 
people cannot always escape the consequences 
of their actions, even when done in the name 
of the corporation. 
A typical factual scenario in which the issue 
of officer liability arises in the travel industry (a 
field in which the author frequendy litigates) 
is as follows. An airline or ticket seller has en-
tered into a contract with a travel agency. As 
part of the arrangement, the agency will sell 
goods and services that are provided and facili-
tated by the airline. To maintain the relation-
ship and pursuant to the contract, the agency 
must file financial reports on a weekly basis, 
and must pay the airline based upon the con-
tent of the financial reports, including sales 
data. The contract provides that the goods 
held by the travel agency will remain in trust 
until sold. Eventually, the relationship sours 
when it is discovered that the agency has been 
underreporting its sales. 
While a judgment against the agency for 
breach of contract is an almost certain result, in 
most cases it has little or no assets with which 
to satisfy the judgment. Moreover, absent a 
sense of moral obligation, the individual own-
ers of the business likely believe themselves to 
be free from legal responsibility for these debts 
and will not voluntarily repay these "business" 
losses. Looking to the officer responsible for 
the misreporting has often proven a fruitful 
course of recovery, and, in the past few years, 
courts have generally agreed that personal li-
ability may be found in such cases. 
Personal Liability Without 
Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Although an individual may become liable in 
instances in which the corporate veil is pierced, 
one need not pursue that often-difficult path 
to hold an officer of a corporation personally 
liable. A corporation can only act through its 
C. Erik Gustafson is a shareholder in the Alexandria, Virginia office of LeClair 
Ryan, a professional corporation. Mr. Gustafson routinely represents clients 
in commercial disputes, in the defense of insurance and surety claims, and in 
prosecuting claims in bankruptcy matters. 
directors and officers. Generally, an officer 
director is not liable for his or her conduct 
relation to the acts of the corporationHowev 
an officer of a corporation is personally lial 
for intentional torts, such as breach of fiducia 
duty, conversion, or breach of trust, that he 
she commits on behalf of the corporatio 
PMC, Inc. v. Kodisha, 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, < 
Cal.Rptr.2d 663 (2000) (officer may be liable 
competitor of corporation for misappropri 
tion of trade secrets where officer invested i 
was in control of, and directed or authoriz< 
general corporate operations directed towa] 
unlawful conduct); Kilduffv. Adams,Inc., 2] 
Conn. 314,593 A.2d 478 (1991) (an offic. 
who commits a tort is personally liable to tl 
victim regardless of whether the corporatic 
is liable); First Financial USA, Inc. v. Steingt 
760 So.2d 996 (Fla.App. 2000) (officer may \ 
personally liable for fraud in the inducemen 
although actions were committed when ac 
ingon behalf of corporation); L B. Industrie 
Inc. v. Smith, 631 F.Supp. 922 (D.Idaho 198* 
(officer may be liable for corporation's wronj 
fill acts that he directs or sanctions); Ande\ 
son v. Heartland Oil & Gas, Inc., 249 Kan. 451 
819 P.2d 1192 (1991) (officer and corporatio 
may be joindy liable for officer's fraudulen 
promise of future events involving investmer 
scheme); Turner v. Wilson, 620 So.2d 545 (Mia 
1993) (officer may be liable to corporation3 
creditors when he has participated in the tor 
tuous act, or has authorized or directed it, o 
has acted in his own behalf, or has had an 
knowledge of, or given any consent to, the ac 
or transaction, or has acquiesced in it whei 
he either knew or by the exercise of reason 
able care should have known of it and shoulc 
have objected and taken steps to prevent it) 
Loprestiv. Termlliger, 126 F.3d 34 (2d Or. 1997 
(officer may be personally liable to corpora-
tion's employees for conversion where fundi 
were used for other business purposes anc 
not deposited into ERISA accounts); Texas v 
Mink, 990 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.App. 1999) (of-
freer personally liable where actions caused 
corporation to breach its fiduciary duty tc 
creditor); Cook v. The 1031 Exchange Corp., 
29 Va.Cir. 302,1992 Va.Cir.LEXIS 31; Ameri-
can Honda Finance Corp. v. Francis, Civ. A. 92-
0085-B, 1993 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 442 (W.D.Va. 
1993) (finding corporate officer had fiduciary 
duty to company's creditors and remanding case 
to bankruptcy court on question of "whether 
a'defalcation' occurred"); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac 
Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001,1021 
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9th Cir. 1985); DER Travel Services, Inc. v. 
)ream Tours & Adventures, Inc., 2001 U.S. 
)ist.LEXIS 15581 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (corporate 
octrine does not provide any protection to 
orporate agents or owners with respect to 
leir own liabilities and obligations, incurred 
s a result of their own acts). 
"[0]ne whose actions taken in bad faith 
mse tortious injury to another is not insu-
ted from personal liability merely because the 
lalefactor was a corporate officer, director, or 
nployee acting within the scope of employ-
icnt at the time of the commission of the fraud" 
rePontier, 165 B.R. 797,799 (BanknD.Md. 
>94). In Transgo v. Ajac Transmission Parts, 
pra, the Ninth Circuit held the president of 
:orporation personally liable for the corpor-
ion'saacts of unfair competition.* 768 F.2d at 
21. The president conspired with another cor-
ration to imitate the mechanical part manu-
rtured by another company and try to pass it 
"as its product. Due to the "instrumental role" 
it the president played in the conspiracy, the 
art concluded that the evidence supported 
i finding of personal liability. Id Thus, even 
iiout piercing the corporate; veil, an officer 
director can be found personally liable. See 
TJ&toier,154B.R. 459,464 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 
)2) (finding it unnecessary to disaiss pierc-
the corporate veil because the debtor, as an 
cer, could be held personally liable for the 
ldulent conduct of the corporation in which 
participated). 
While it may seem obvious that intentional 
j may result in personal liability, omissions 
Y also lead to liability. Corporate officers 
equally liable for the torts they cause by 
r omissions as well as acts of commission: 
Ipecific direction or sanction ofi or active 
participation or cooperation in, a positively 
wrongful act of commission or omission 
rhich operates to the injury or prejudice of 
le complaining party [generates] individ-
al liability in damages of an officer or a 
Mrporation for the tort of the corporation. 
nan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Asso-
m, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141,1145 (4th Cir 1975) 
)hasis added). See also, In re Pontier, su-
165 B.R. at 801, citing Cruz v. Ortho Phar-
vtical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,907 (1st Cir. 
); Camacho v. 1440RhodelslandAve. Corp., 
V.2d 242,246-47 (D.C.App. 1993). 
icently, a federal court in Virginia elabo-
on this standard of potential omission, 
ng that an officer of a travel agency may 
Id liable for breach of the agency's fidu-
ciary duty if "he participates in, ratifies, or 
otherwise authorizes the corporations breach 
of its fiduciary duty... [and] may be held li-
able if he fails to exercise the same degree of 
discretion in the management of trust that a 
prudent man would exercise in his own af-
fairs." Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Pishvaian, 
155 F.Supp.2d 659,667 (E.D.Va. 2001). Thus, 
an officer may become personally liable not 
only by acting inappropriately, but also by fail-
ing to act appropriately. The California courts 
have stated this principle more broadly: 
A corporate officer or director, like any other 
JB usiness people cannot 
always escape the 
consequences of their 
actions, even when done 
in the name of the 
corporation. 
person, owes a duty to refrain from injur-
ing others. In the context of a negligence 
claim, the Supreme Court has held that, 
like any other person, "directors individu-
ally owe a duty of care, independent of the 
corporate entity's own duty, to refrain from 
acting in a manner that creates an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to third parties...." 
Stated differently, the Supreme Court held: 
"Like any other citizen, corporate officers 
have a societal duty to refrain from acts 
that are reasonably risky to third persons 
even when their shareholders or creditors 
would agree that such conduct serves the 
institution's best interests." 
PMC Inc. v. Kadisha, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at 
1381,citingFrances I v. Village Green Owners 
Association, 42 Cal.3d 490,229 CaLRptr. 456 
(1986). 
Personal Liability of 
Officers and Directors 
Consistent with the general principles dis-
cussed above, several courts around die coun-
try have specifically addressed the issue of the 
individual liability of officers and directors of 
corporate travel agencies that have defaulted 
in their obligations. 
The Maryland federal district court has 
found that a vice president and shareholder of 
a travel agency who personally participated in 
the agency's defalcation of funds belonging to 
the airlines could be held personally liable for 
that defalcation. In In re Folliard, 10 B.R. 875 
(D.Md. 1981), Pan American World Airways 
filed a non-dischargeability complaint against 
Robert Folliard, Jr., the vice president and a 
shareholder of Welcome Aboard Vacation Cen-
ter of Washington, D.C., Inc., a travel agency. 
That agency was accredited by the Air Traffic 
Conference of America, but was terminated by 
ATC when it issued drafts for its weekly sales 
that were subsequently returned for insuffi-
cient funds. Following the agency's termina-
tion, Folliard filed for personal bankruptcy. 
Pan Am eventually filed a complaint to deter-
mine the dischargeability of its debt, alleging 
that its claim arose out of Folliard's conversion 
and defalcation of Pan Am's funds while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity. 
Following a trial on the Pan Am complaint, 
the bankruptcy court concluded that while 
Folliard could be held liable for the debt, the 
debt could be discharged unless he personally 
profited from the activity. On appeal, the dis-
trict court overturned the bankruptcy courf s 
ruling, holding that Folliard's participation in 
the tortious activity alone was sufficient to 
find the debt to be non-dischargeable, regard-
less of whether Folliard as an officer actually 
benefited from the activity. 10 B.R. at 877-78. 
In Forastieri v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., No. 79-
2544,1983 US.Dist.LEXIS 15698 (D.P.R. 1983), 
under similar circumstances, the United States 
District Court in Puerto Rico held two directors 
and officers of a travel agency personally respon-
sible for the acts of the agency. The court found 
that the acts of the two directors were such that 
to allow them to escape personal liability "would 
be to sanction fraud, illegality and injustice.'' 
Forastieri, 1983 U.S.DistLEXIS 15698, at *10. 
In granting summary judgment for the 
plaintiff, the Forastieri court found that the in-
dividual officers were liable for their participa-
tion in the conversion of the traffic documents 
(i.e., tickets) and sales proceeds required by 
the underlying corporate contract to be held in 
trust by the agency. Id. at * 13-* 15. Finding the 
officer was liable for the conversion, regardless 
of whether the agency's corporate veil should 
be pierced, the Forastieri court stated {id. at 
* 14), citing Emmert v. Drake, 224 F.2d 299, 
302 (5th Cir. 1955): 
Irrespective of good faith or intent, in an 
instance wherein the corporation had a duty 
to pay out funds from designated proceeds 
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but such proceeds were used for other pur-
poses, the directors were held personally 
liable because they hadaduty to see that the 
funds were used for the agreed-upon pur-
pose and they could not excuse themselves 
on the grounds that they did not dissipate or 
misappropriate the funds nor were in other 
respects derelict in their duty. 
The court continued, u[w]ith respect to the 
context of the failure of a travel agency to remit 
funds collected from the sale of tickets, the per-
sonal liability of officers participating in the 
conversion of the funds held in trust has found 
clear judicial support." Id. at * 15, citing ATC v. 
WaMmark Travel 15 Aviation Cases,No. 18,483 
(CCH1980); Folliard,supra.The court agreed 
that "failure to remit funds collected by a cor-
porate agent which belong to its principal air-
line [gave] rise to personal liability of those 
corporate employees who participated in the 
conversion:' 1983 U.S.DistLEXIS 15698, at 
*16. Thus, even without piercing the corpo-
rate veil, the officers were liable to the extent 
of their participation in the defalcation. 
In Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter Transit 
Traveling 884 ESupp. 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), the 
federal court in Brooklyn determined that an 
individual shareholder of a corporation was 
liable to the creditor for conversion where he 
failed to report properly the travel agenc/s ticket 
sales and also failed to seek approval for the sale 
of his shares in the travel agency, which agency 
subsequently was terminated with a $202,000 
loss, caused solely by the new owners. The In-
ter Transit court determined that even though 
theaformerMowner was not direcdy involved in 
misappropriating the agency's funds, he was 
fully liable for the conversion of those funds 
because his activities in failing to adhere to the 
terms of the agreement with Airlines Report-
ing Corp. with respect to changes in agency 
ownership "set the stage for the misappropria-
tion." Id. at 87. 
A federal bankruptcy court in Virginia re-
cendy held that the abdication of control and 
responsibility over trust property to another 
individual who ultimately caused extensive 
losses constituted a breach of fiduciary duty 
on the part of the individual officer who es-
tablished the underlying arrangement with 
the damaged creditor. In re Bishop, No. 7-00-
00479 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2001). Among its rul-
ings, the court concluded that the corporate 
characteristic of limited liability did not shield 
the individual officer from personal liability 
to the corporation's creditor because he was 
personally involved in and authorized a third-
party agreement, the essence of which was a 
breach of the obligations that the corporation 
had assumed with the creditor. Because of the 
officers personal and controlling involvement 
in both the creation of the underlying trust 
and in its breach, the court had no difficulty 
in finding liability and determining that the 
liability should be non-dischargeable in the 
officer's personal bankruptcy case. 
Note that in order to be personally liable, 
the officer need not have actually received per-
sonal gain from the loss of the creditor. Dixon 
v. Texas, 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.App. 1991) (of-
ficer may be liable for any tort committed by 
the corporation through him, regardless of 
whether the officer personally benefits from 
the tort committed); Lopresti v. Terwilliger, su-
pra; In re Fottiard, supra; Forastieri v. Eastern 
Air Lines, supra; Airlines Reporting Corp. v. 
Pishvaian, supra. 
Intentional Torts-Is "Intention" 
Really Required? 
Accepting as a legal principle that an officer 
may be held liable for an intentional tort, how 
high of a hurdle does this present practically? 
With respect to the torts of conversion and 
breach of fiduciary duty, it would appear that 
the issue of intention is truly just a hurdle, 
rather than a bar. 
"Conversion" seems to be a polite word for 
theft. Under Virginia law, for example, conver-
sion is the wrongfiil exercise of ownership over 
the goods of another, when such exercise ex-
cludes the rights of the true owner. McCormick 
v. AT&T Technobgies, Inc., 934 R2d 531,535 
(4th Cir.1991), citing Buckeye National Bank 
v. Huff and Cook, 114 Va. 1,75 S.E. 769,772 
(1912). This is virtually the same definition 
used throughout the country. FMC Corp. v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 (7th Or. 
1990); Moore v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 215 Cal.App.3d 709,249 CaLRptr. 494, 
503 (1988), citing I8Am./wr.2d,aConversion," 
at 145-46; Waisath v. Luck's Stores, Inc., 474 
S.W.2d444,447 (Tex. 1971). Conversion does 
not require that the accused party benefited 
from the action: 
Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully 
exerted over the property of another, and 
in denial of his rights or inconsistent there-
with, may be treated as a conversion and it 
is not necessary that the wrongdoer apply 
the property to his own use. 
Cook v. 1031 Exchange, supra, 29 Va.Cir. at 
304, citing Universal CI T. Credit Corp. v. Ka\ 
Ian, 198 Va. 67,76,92 S.E.2d 359 (1956). No 
that intention is not a required element of th 
tort. Nor is it required that the person cor 
verting the property do so for his own use. 
In the context of travel agency litigatioi 
courts have routinely held that the failure t 
adhere to the terms of the underlying contrac 
results in the conversion of the traffic docu 
ments and/or conversion of the proceeds fror 
their sale. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter Tran 
sit Travel Inc., 884 ESupp. 83 (E.D.N.Y11995 
(holding a 50 percent shareholder personall 
liable when he "set the stage" for conversioi 
although he was not personalty involved);imzs 
tieri v. Eastern Air Lines, supra; In re Folliard 
supra (where officer was personally liable fo 
breach of trust); United States v. Weinstein 
834 F.2d 1454 (9th Or. 1987) (tickets tha 
were sold without remitting payment to credi-
tor were deemed to fit into the category o\ 
"goods, wares [or] merchandise... stolen, con-
verted or taken by fraud,"). See also, Airlinei 
ReportingCorp. v. ATI Travel, Inc., No. 98-1511-
A (E.D.Va. 1998) (order denying motion seek-
ing dismissal of conversion and fraud dairas 
against travel agent). 
Under Virginia law, an officer or director may 
be held liable for conversion when a corporation 
holds property m trust and fails to properly ac-
count for it. Cook v. 1031 Exchange, supra. Li-
ability of corporate officers extends not only 
to tortious acts in which he participates, but 
also those tortious acts he brings about. In re 
Pontier, supra. See also, Michies Jurisprudence, 
"Corporations'^^l (1999); Restatement(Sec-
ond) of Agency §343; see also, Lopresti v. Ter-
williger, supra (applying New York law); Dixon 
v. Texas, supra (applying Texas law). 
For example, in In re Bishop, supra, the court 
conduded that the officer's entering into and 
facilitating an agreement with a third party, 
that by its terms violated the trust agreement 
that the same officer had authorized between 
his company and a creditor, gave rise to liabil-
ity for conversion of property at the hands of 
the third party. Likewise, a bankruptcy court 
in Virginia found that where the sole officer of 
a corporate travel agency created a lay-away 
plan and permitted employees to issue tickets 
without collecting payment, all in violation of 
the underlying agreement, the officer would be 
non-dischargeably liable. In re Hashemizadeh, 
AP No. 97-1266 (E.D.Va. Oct. 27,1999). Fi-
nally, in Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Inter Tran-
sit Travel, supra, the court held an officer liable 
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where the liability accrued from failing to no-
tify the creditor of a change in ownership of 
the officer's corporation as required by the 
underlying contract. 
Once conversion of property is demon-
strated, "the plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
irrespective of good or bad faith, care or 
negligence, knowledge or ignorance." Cook v. 
1031 Exchange, supra, 29 Va.Cir.at 304; Univer-
sal CI.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67,76, 
92S.E.2d359 (1956 ).As Judge Ellis concluded 
in Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Pbhvaian: "Had 
defendant dealt in a similarly direct fashion 
with the ticket stock, as he did with the tick-
ets sales proceeds, say by issumg or specifi-
cally authorizing the issuance of the ticket 
stock in a manner contrary to the [underlying 
contract], he would have been liable for conver-
sion of such ticket stock because his conduct 
would constitute a wrongful exercise of domin-
ion over the ticket stock. And this would be so 
even though defendant lacked knowledge of 
the conversion and believed in good faith that 
le had the authority to dispose of the ticket 
;tock in that fashion." 155 F.Supp.2d at 667. 
Sreach of Fiduciary buty 
Che law of most states appears to recognize 
hree separate fiduciary duties in these credi-
or-agent relationships. First, an agent is under 
fiduciary duty to its principal. Second, under 
he underlying agreement, the agent is a trustee 
:>r the benefit of the contracting party with re-
pect to the ordering, possession, accounting, 
nd remittance of certain specifically identified 
roperty. In this respect, a trustee is under a 
duciary duty to account to his beneficiary, 
inally, a corporate officer or director is under 
personal fiduciary duty to his corporation 
id its creditors to act in a manner consistent 
ith the corporation's interests and its obliga-
ms to its creditors. 
uty to the Principal 
trustee or agent is under a fiduciary duty to 
s beneficiary or principal. Rowland v. Kable, 
4 Va. 343,367,6 S.E.2d 633 (1940). Such a 
ationship exists "when special confidence 
s been reposed in one who in equity and 
od conscience is bound to act in good faith 
d with due regard for the interests of one 
>osing the confidence." H-B Ltd. Partner-
p v. Wimmer, 220 Va. 176,179,257 S.E.2d 
) (1979), citing Home v. Holley, 167 Va. 234, 
1,188 S.E. 169,172 (1936); see also, Allen 
ilty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 V*. 441,446,318 
S.E.2d 592 (1984)."One who is entrusted with 
the business of another cannot be allowed to 
make that business an object of interest to him-
self" Rowland, supra, 174 Va. at 366. Agency 
consists of "a fiduciary relationship resulting 
from one person's manifestation of consent to 
another person that the other shall act on his 
behalf and subject to his control, and the other 
person's manifestation of consent so to act." 
Reistroffer v. Person, 247 Va. 45,48,439 S.E.2d 
376 (1994); see also, State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co. v. Weisman, 247 Va. 199,203, 
441 S.E.2d 16 (1994). 
" 0 1 rporate officers are 
equally liable for the 
torts they cause by their 
omissions as well as acts 
of commission. 
When a fiduciary relationship arises, the 
fiduciary should be aware of his heightened 
state of responsibility. For example, the fidu-
ciary is responsible for keeping the principal 
informed about anything that "might affect 
the principal's decision whether and how to 
zct?Owenv.Shelton,221V*. 1051,277 S.E.2d 
189,191 (1981); Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 
805 F.Supp. 1312,1321 (RD.Va. 1992) (a fi-
duciary has a "duty of utmost good faith and 
frill and fair disclosure of all material facts, as 
well as an affirmative obligations to employ 
reasonable care to avoid misleading one with 
whom he deals"). 
Duty as Trusteee 
The elements necessary to create a trust in-
clude: (1) sufficient words to create a trust; 
(2) a deariy defined trust res; and (3) an intent 
toaeateatrustrelationship.Ieowardv. Counts, 
221 Va. 582,588,272 S.E.2d 190,194 (1980). 
Such trusts spring from the agreement of the 
parties, and all persons who have the capac-
ity to hold and dispose of property can im-
press a trust upon it. Fleenor v. Hensley, 121 
Va. 367,373,93 S.E. 582,584 (1917). TTirough 
the underlying contract, express agency is cre-
ated, and the corporation acts as an agent of the 
client, giving rise to the fiduciary relationship. 
In re Ellison, 265 B.R. 539 (Bankr.S.D.W.Va. 
1999),<jf<42001 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 20211. Courts 
applying the law of Florida and Puerto Rico to 
similar facts have recognized this relation-
ship. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Incentivelnter-
nationale Travel, Inc., 566 So.2d 1377,1379 
(Fla.App. 1990) (creditor contract creates a 
principal-agent relationship, which is one 
"based upon the trust and confidence of the 
principal in the agent"); Forastieri v. Eastern 
Air Lines, supra, 1983 U.S.DistXEXIS 15698, 
at *11 (analogous contract created princi-
pal-agent relationship that was "prima facie 
fiduciary? as is the case when one sells the 
property of another). And courts in New York 
and Texas have applied this to other kinds of 
fiduciary accounts. Lopresti v. Terwilliger, supra 
(ERISA funds held in trust); Dixon v. Texas, 
supra (sales tax proceeds held in trust). 
Duty to Others 
An increasingly recognized fiduciary duty arises 
between corporate officers and their corpor-
ation's creditors. In American Honda Finance 
v. Francis, supra, the Virginia federal district 
court found that the bankruptcy court had 
erred as a matter of law by not recognizing a 
fiduciary relationship based on the debtor's 
status as president and chief operating officer 
of the company. 1993 U.S.DistXEXIS 442, at 
* 8. The court stated <c[i]t is well established 
that corporate officers occupy a fiduciary re-
lationship to... [the corporation's] creditors." 
Id. Likewise, the Ellison court held that as a 
matter of law, the failure of corporate oflBcers 
to properly account for the proceeds of a trust 
for the benefit of their corporations creditor 
constituted defalcation while acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity. In re Ellison, supra. 
Conclusion 
Obviously, given the case law discussed above, 
there is ample support in many instances to 
litigate the issue of officer involvement of what 
would otherwise appear to be a business loss. 
And, given the increasing complexity of com-
mercial agreements, particularly those that 
rely upon the accuracy of financial reporting 
or the disposition of assets in which a credi-
tor has taken security, one may reasonably 
expect that the individual officers tasked with 
fulfilling the corporations responsibilities will 
come under closer scrutiny. One should not 
fear, however, that this liability is unfettered. 
Practical experience has taught that whether 
an officer will be held personally liable is still 
a largely factual, rather than legal, question. 
While the case law discussed above provides a I 
continued on page 59 
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Internet privacy may not be as prominent as it 
was a year or so ago, the risk of enforcement 
actions or private lawsuits does not seem to 
have declined. Instead, the risk actually ap-
pears to have increased and will likely continue such policies are accurate, implemented cor-
to inaease in the months and years ahead Ac- rectly, and supported by sufficient training and 
cordingly, when developing privacy policies, continued monitoring of the legal and regula-
effbrts must be directed towards ensuring that tory environment. HI 
Software Contracts, from page 40 
ment? In the case of shrink-wrap agreements, 
it is easy to determine because the package 
was opened, and there is physical evidence, 
ie., the software is out of the box. But even in 
that scenario, the software provider must prove 
that the shrink-wrap agreement was in every 
box. If the defendant contends that the agree-
ment was missing from the particular box it 
received, the whole issue of the software sup-
plier's quality control and inspection processes 
will come into play because it is unlikely that 
the software provider will have actual knowl-
edge about a particular box of software. De-
fense counsel always should investigate to make 
sure that the agreement was in feet contained in 
the box rather than just conceding that point. 
When dealing with dick-wrap or browse-
wrap agreements, if the defendant denies agree-
ing to the terms of the agreement it is much 
more difficult to prove that someone actually 
gave her assent Clicking on the appropriate spot 
on a computer screen may create a "signature" 
but that signature is electronic The software de-
veloper will have to present testimony that the 
software is designed to end the installation pro-
cess in the event the user does not accept the 
terms of the license agreement However, in-
stances have occurred where clicking the button 
that denies assent to the license agreement still 
allows installation of the software to proceed. 
The integrity and infallibility of that aspect of 
the program will be at issue. Defense counsel 
should consider the possibility that the software 
could be installed even if die defendant did not 
agree to the terms of the agreement An expert 
should be consulted to evaluate the infallibility 
of the software and whether the fact of instal-
lation proves that the assent was given. 
The software developer's other evidence 
will be the software source code data itself, 
which the developer may contend reflects that 
the defendant clicked on "Yes" in response to 
the prompt for its assent to the terms of the 
agreement. Obviously, it will require expert 
testimony on the part of die software devel-
oper to interpret the source code data and ex-
plain the implications to the data of clicking 
"Yes" or "No" in response to the prompt. 
The software developer is probably the only 
party in a position to interpret its proprietary 
source code data. Defense counsel should con-
sider seeking that underlying source code data 
as well as all other information necessary to 
interpret that data so that the defense expert is 
in a position to evaluate the accuracy of die de-
velopers position. The threat that the developer 
will have to disclose its proprietary design in-
formation may in itself lead to a resolution of 
click-wrap and browse-wrap disputes. 
Conclusion 
While most courts continue to struggle to apply 
provisions of common law contract law and 
UCC Article 2 to die various forms of End User 
License Agreements, a movement is afoot, as re-
flected in die UCTIA, to conceptually change the 
formation process of contracts to fit the needs of 
parties to modem software licenses. The present 
state of disarray in judicial interpretations of the 
law as it applies to these agreements creates an 
element of uncertainty for all parties. Until these 
issues are resolved with some uniformity, they 
will continue to challenge attorneys, whether 
they are negotiating contracts or litigating 
breaches of those agreements. HI 
Personal Liability of Officers, from page 47 
road map to liability, our experience suggests 
that to overcome the latent sense of the cor-
porate shield, the court or jury must want to 
believe that the individual before them should 
be liable. Elements bearing upon this deter-
mination of culpability include: the officer's 
specific responsibilities as set forth in the 
underlying corporate documents, internal 
memoranda, and agreements; an analysis of 
whether the officer acted in a reasonable 
manner, consistent with her responsibilities 
to die business and its creditors; whether the 
officer profited from the situation (note that 
while personal gain is not a requirement of li-
ability, it is damning from the perspective of 
most fact finders); and, whether the corpora-
tion truly acted as a separate business, rather 
than as an extension of the officer. As to this 
final point, experience suggests that while a 
court may not reach the high standard of pierc-
ing the corporate veil, the appearance of merg-
ing one's interests with the corporation's will 
go a long way to satisfying the fact finder's 
sense of justice in holding die officer person-
ally responsible for the losses. HI 
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